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Abstract: Okasha (2006) proposed distinguishing aspects of selection: those based in particle level traits 
(MSL1), and those based in group level traits (MSL2). It is proposed here that MSL1 can usefully be further 
split into two aspects, one (MLS1E) representing selection of particles based in their individual interaction with 
environmental properties, and one (MLS1G) representing Multi Level Selection of particles based in their 
relation to group properties. Similarly MSL2 can be split into two parts based in this distinction. This splitting 
enables a characterisation of how emergent group properties can affect particle selection, and thus affect group 
traits that are important for survival. This proposal is illustrated by considering a key aspect of animal and 
human life, namely the formation of social groups, which greatly enhances survival prospects. The biological 
mechanism that underlies such group formation is the existence of innate primary emotional systems studied 
by Panksepp (1998), effective through the ascending systems in the brain that diffuse neurotransmitters such as 
dopamine and norepinephrine through the cortex. Evolutionary emergence of such brain mechanisms, and 
hence the emergence of social groups, can only result from multi-level selection characterised by the 
combination of MSL2 and MLS1G. The distinctions proposed here should be useful in other contexts. 
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1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Samir Okasha's book Evolution and the Levels of Selection (Okasha 2006) gives a comprehensive 
discussion of the ongoing debate about levels of selection in evolutionary biology. Massimo 
Pigliucci's review (Pigliucci 2010) emphasizes that an important feature of the book is the distinction 
made therein between Multi Level Selection-1 (MSL1), concerned with the evolution of particle-
level traits, and Multi Level Selection-2 (MLS2), concerned with the collectives themselves and 
their evolution. This distinction helps considerably in clarifying some of the disputes that have arisen 
as regards multilevel selection processes.  
 
The new suggestion made in this note is that it may be useful to refine Okasha’s proposal by 
defining MLS1E, selection of individuals due to the environmental context independent of the 
existence of the group, leading to group fitness-1, and MLS1G, selection of individuals that is 
essentially due to the existence of the group as an emergent entity, leading to group fitness-2.  
These definitions at the individual level will be reflected by corresponding definitions at the group 
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level: MLS2E is the group level selection effect due to aggregation of individual advantage 
characterised by MLS1E .In contrast to this, MLS2G is group level selection that occurs specifically 
because of the existence of the group as an emergent entity, resulting in properties at the individual 
level being selected for by MLS1G. The combination of MLS2G and MLS1G is a form of selection of 
individuals that is essentially multilevel in character. 
 
In order to make the case that this proposal of distinguishing MLS1G and MLS1E can work and is 
useful, it is necessary to give an example where this distinction can be convincingly made. That is 
the topic of Section 2, discussing group formation in all higher animals (including humans). It is then 
necessary to show there is some payoff from this proposal. Okasha discusses how a linear regression 
model is often better than Price’s Equation when investigating multilevel selection. Section 3 
considers how the proposal made here will be reflected in a modified version of that linear 
regression model, making the multi-level relations clearer. Section 4 presents an underlying 
biological mechanism (innate emotional systems) which plausibly explains animal group formation 
as discussed in Section 2. This mechanism is realised through specific aspects of the brain, namely 
the `ascending systems’ linking nuclei in the limbic system to the cortex. It is suggested that 
existence of this biological mechanism and the associated brain structures can only be explained by 
multilevel selection, as considered in the preceding sections. Finally Section 5 briefly considers how 
this proposal fits into the bigger picture of evolutionary theory.    
 
2: EVOLUTION AND THE ISSUE OF GROUP FORMATION 
 
This section considers the core issue of group formation in all higher animals. To make the situation 
specific, consider the case of why animals, say buffalo in the Kruger National Park, or people, say 
Bushmen in the Kalahari, find it important to group together in herds or tribes. The key point is that 
a collection of buffalo wandering around on their own is not a herd; it is an aggregation (the whole is 
just the sum of its parts). If the same buffalo band together as a herd interacting in a social way, they 
can collectively protect each other, sensing danger earlier than when alone and acting together to 
protect each other, and so are far more likely to survive. A specific example: a herd can act together 
as a unit with the common purpose of warding off danger of attack by lions.
1
 The same is true for a 
group of Bushmen: living isolated lives on their own, they are vulnerable to many dangers and will 
find it difficult to get food. If they band together, on the other hand, they can act collectively to 
protect young, detect dangers, ward off predators, and hunt together, and can share food, skills, 
resources, and information. The whole is much more than the sum of its parts; the young are much 
more likely to survive. A similar example is social learning in primate foraging decisions (de Waal,  
                                                           
1
 For a graphic demonstration of the protection provided in this context by the common purpose of a collective 
of buffalo, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xHIkUzRw2jw. 
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Borgeaud, and White 2013). It is crucial that culture and technology can evolve in this context. A 
specific example: the skills of animal tracking (Liebenberg 2001)
2
 are passed down from generation 
to generation through a group educational process. This collective process, impossible unless the 
group acts as a collective, greatly enhances the survival prospects of the group. Banding together 
into social groups probably played a key role in the evolution of language and intelligence (Donald 
1991, Pringle 2013), which enabled human domination over all other species. 
 
The selection dynamic in action is shown in diagram 1. 
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Diagram 1: Multilevel selection: selection effects between the environment, the collective, and the 
individual. MLS1E  acts on individuals irrespective of the group but MLS1G acts on individuals 
because of the existence of the group. Consequently MLS2E emerges as a group level selection effect 
due to aggregation. By contrast MLS2G is group level selection essentially due to group existence.  
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 See http://www.cybertracker.org/tracking/basics-of-tracking/spoor-identification for some of its aspects. 
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The individual level Trait1E is an individual trait that gives an advantage to the individual in the 
context of the environment, and this advantage has nothing to do with the existence of the group. 
Examples are individuals being able to run very fast, being very strong, and so on. Selection for such 
traits is thus the case of selection based on individual traits alone, and can operate in an unstructured 
population in which there are no groups at all, but it will also operate when groups exist. This trait 
confers individual fitness-1E in regard to the overall environment, and is selected for by MLS1E.  
 
It is not multi-level selection as regards the individuals, in that it is just selection based on properties 
of the individual. However aggregation of the individual Trait1E over all the members of the group 
improves group survival capacity, and so underlies the group level Trait1 (the group is more likely to 
survive if it is made of stronger and faster members). Even though this is “nothing but” the sum of 
the parts, it enhances group survival. This leads to multilevel selection MLS2E at the group level, in 
that this aspect of the group’s fitness is due to aggregation of the enhanced fitness of its members.  
 
Trait2 is a group trait that gives a selective advantage to the group as a whole because the group is 
an emergent entity, acting as a collective. In the case of the buffalo, examples are the herd moving 
together to seek water in places remembered by older animals, forming a defensive ring against 
predators, and so on. These obviously can't be a trait of the individuals (one buffalo is not a herd, 
which by will definition require at least 5 members; less than that is a group, which confers lesser 
advantage). They confer fitness-2 due to group existence in the overall environment (which includes 
lions in the surroundings), and are selected for by MLS2G. In the case of the bushmen, traits leading 
to advanced survival prospects include the use of language to communicate with each other, and 
group hunting of giraffe. These are of course not possible if the group does not exist. 
 
At the individual level, Trait1G is an individual trait that gives an advantage relative to the 
environment because of the existence of the group; it is a capacity underlying way the individual 
takes advantage of the existence of the group, which could not occur if the group did not exist. Thus 
cooperative individuals who are willing to learn will benefit more through the group’s existence. 
Those who ignore group wisdom are likely to perish soon. 
 
The key group level trait underlying all these possibilities is the mere fact of group existence: the 
tendency to live together as a cooperative group, emergent from the individuals that comprise it. It is 
the buffalo being together as a herd that allows crucial secondary traits to develop. The same is true 
a fortiori for the bushmen, who through the existence of the group develop far greater survival 
capacity, particularly through development of technology and tactics that is taught to children.  
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The key individual level trait underlying the individual benefit accruing from the group, is the 
individual having a propensity to join a group. They then can benefit by learning from the group, 
getting its protection, and so on. It is because of this sociable propensity at the individual level that 
the group emerges from the individuals that comprise it: this is the glue that holds the group 
together. This confers individual fitness fitness-1G in regard to the environment because of the 
existence and nature of the group, and is selected for by MLS1G. Individuals who do not have this 
propensity to join a group (they like to keep away from the group and go off on their own, are 
uncooperative and unwilling to learn, and so on) are not so likely to survive, because they do not 
benefit from the group’s existence. This all depends on MLS2, because there would be no advantage 
to group membership if MLS2 did not exist. Thus the corresponding selective factor reaching down 
to the individual level is the combination of MLS2 at the group level and MLS1G in terms of 
individual behaviour. This depends essentially on emergent group properties (you can’t learn from 
other herd members what is safe to eat and what not, if you don’t belong to a herd where this is 
known).  In Section 4, I will consider what mechanisms underlie this tendency to form groups. 
 
In summary: the key point in the present proposal is the idea that one can separate out MLS1G from 
MLS1E, and MLS2G from MLS2E. It seems clear that one can do so in the cases cited here: some 
group traits confer advantage essentially because of group existence; some related individual traits 
confer advantage if and only if the group exists. Examples are the capacity to cooperate, and the 
capacity to learn from others. But the key lower level trait that leads to group level advantage 
characterised by MLS2G is the trait of forming meaningful cooperative groups.  That is what we 
focus on below (Section 4). It has played a key role in the evolution of humanity. 
 
3: LINEAR REGRESSION EQUATIONS 
 
Linear regression models consider a collective-level trait as part of the context relevant to each 
particle within that collective, according to the equation (Okasha 2006: 87,198; Pigliucci 2010): 
 
w = β1 z + β2 Z + e                  (1) 
 
where w is the particle’s fitness, z is the particle-level trait, Z is the collective-level trait, β1, β2 are 
regression coefficients, and e is the error term.  
 
According to the present view, one can refine this relation in a number of ways. Define z1E as the 
particle-level trait solely due to individual fitness, and z1G as the particle-level trait for individual 
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fitness because of group existence. Similarly define Z1E as the group-level trait due to aggregation of 
individual fitness: Z1E = Σ z1E, and Z1G as the group-level trait essentially due to group existence.  
 
We can then contemplate firstly the group level linear regression equation: 
 
W = B1E Z1E + B2G Z1G + e1       (2) 
 
where W is the group’s fitness, B1E is the regression coefficient for fitness-1, and B2G the regression 
coefficients for fitness-1G.  Secondly, there is the corresponding particle level equation: 
 
w = β1E z1E + β2G z1G + e2       (3) 
 
where w is the particle’s fitness, β1E is the regression coefficient for fitness-1E, and β2G that for 
fitness-1G.  Finally there are the two multilevel relations:  
 
W = B1E Σ z1E + B2G Z1G + e21       (4) 
 
expressing the way individual level advantage adds up to group level advantage for aggregate 
variables, and  
 
w = β1E z1E + β12G z1G Z1G + e12       (5) 
 
expressing the way group level advantage due to the group existence chains down to individual 
advantage. The latter equation is non-linear in that it depends on the product Z := z1G Z1G, necessary 
to show how z1G and Z1G act in concert to create selection advantage (see Figure 1); there will be no 
effect if either of these terms vanishes. It is this non-linearity that underlies the crucial importance of 
group effects.  This non-linearity is because MLS2G combined with MLS1G gives a route 
 
    MLS2  = MLS2G o  MLS1G                    (6) 
 
whereby the environment constrains the particle properties in virtue of the combination of selection 
criteria fitness-2 G and fitness-1G; they then act up to the emergent level to give the required traits 
Trait2 at the group level in virtue of the lower level traits Trait1G. The way this happens depends on 
whether we are concerned with evolutionary (diachronic), developmental, or functional (synchronic) 
mechanisms and timescales. 
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The set of equations (2)-(5) obviously allow a more detailed analysis of multilevel effects than does 
the original equation (1). It is a pragmatic issue as to which of the selection effects represented in (5) 
by β1E and β12G is more important in a specific context. 
 
4: THE UNDERLYING BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS 
 
The key issue I now address is the behavioural and biological mechanisms at the individual level that 
underlies formation and stability of social groups, thereby leading to the group selection advantages 
fitness-2 discussed in section 2.  
 
Behavioural systems: There are two basic behavioural needs relating the group level to the 
individual level in order to ensure group formation and stabilisation. 
 
1. Group formation: Firstly, in order that meaningful social groups exist, cooperative behaviour 
between the units that make up the group is crucial: “cooperation amongst lower level units is central 
to the emergence of new higher levels, because only cooperation can trade fitness from lower to 
higher levels” (Michod 1999). There are all sorts of mechanisms at the group level intended to make 
this happen (roles, uniforms, teaching, myths, and so on): “each element making up a social system 
serves a function that assures the maintenance of the system” (Longres 1990: 39). But that is not 
enough: in the case of animals and humans, the individual must be responsive to them: they must 
want to belong to the group. There needs to be an internal mechanism to produce this response. 
 
2.Group stabilisation: Generically whenever individuals cooperate together to form groups, there 
must be mechanisms for regulation of conflict (Okasha 2006: 205), requiring adaptations that 
suppress within-group competition in order that the group emerge as a genuine whole with 
adaptations of its own (Okasha 2006: 221-222, 227-228). Again there will be group level 
mechanisms and processes with this purpose (sanctions, teaching, a legal system, and so on), but by 
themselves they will not suffice: there must be internal mechanisms to help produce this outcome. 
 
How are these realised at the individual level? In the case of all mammals (including humans), there 
are plausible biological mechanisms at the individual level underlying both the formation and 
conflict regulation of such emergent groups. Social groups form because of innate tendencies of 
individuals to form such groups. The source for this tendency lies in innate primordial emotional 
systems shared by humans and all higher animals (Panksepp 1998), which are our evolutionary 
heritage, given to us to help guide decisions we make (Ellis and Toronchuk 2005) and thereby shape 
intellect (Damasio 1995, 1999). These innate emotional systems function through giving us feelings 
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that tend to produce specific kinds of actions that have promoted survival in our evolutionary 
ancestors, both human and mammalian (Panksepp and Biven 2012).  
 
In particular there are two such systems that have evolved to create and protect emergent social 
groups as discussed above. These are (Toronchuk and Ellis 2013),  
 
1. Group Formation (Trait z1G[1]): an affiliation/attachment  system, needed to create such 
groups, producing feelings of wanting to belong and loneliness when excluded, and starting with 
mother-child bonding (Stevens and Price 2000:44-45); 
 
2. Group Stabilisation (Trait z1G[2]): a social ranking system, needed to protect groups by 
regulating conflict (Stevens and Price 2000:47-48; Price, 1967). This generates a dominance 
hierarchy which is a social ranking system (the pecking order, the alpha male, etc.); conflict takes 
place to attain one place in this system, but then acceptance of one’s place, and associated territorial 
rights, regularizes resource allocation in a largely peaceful manner.  
 
These two systems dominate much of social life, and provide the emotional power that enables 
groups to function. As stated by Stephens and Price (2000:50), 
 
“In short, the evidence points to the existence of two great archetypal systems: that 
concerned with attachment, affiliation, care-giving, care-receiving, and  altruism; and that 
concerned with rank, status, discipline, law and order, territory and possessions. These may 
well be the basic archetypal patterns on which social adjustment and maladjustment, 
psychiatric health and sickness depend.”   
 
These primary emotional systems have evolved over evolutionary times precisely in order to ensure 
that social groups will come into existence and then be stable (there can be no other reason for their 
existence as genetically determined systems). We know that they are selected for, because they are 
innate, and are shared with our ancestral relatives, human and animal (Panksepp and Biven 2012). 
Thus they are key examples of individual level traits z1G that have been selected for via individual 
selection MLS1G, in order to promote group benefits Z1G, as indicated by equation (2).   
 
These systems enable the group to come into being, and would not exist as innate systems if there 
was no major benefit provided by existence of social groups. They have been genetically determined 
because they are crucial to survival. Putting these together with the kinds of group level traits Z1G 
discussed in Section 2, the implication is that in equation (5), z1G Z1G ≠ 0 in both cases. 
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Brain Structure: As in all biology, structure and function are closely linked (Campbell and Reece, 
2008). The behavioural mechanisms suggested here must be based in genetically determined 
underlying neural systems in order to be plausible. This is indeed so: the brain mechanism 
underlying these behavioural tendencies is the diffusely projecting `ascending systems’ of neurons 
linking nuclei in the limbic system to the neocortex (Kingsley 1996: 132-133), together with the 
associated neurotransmitters. These systems
3
 spread small-molecule neurotransmitters and 
monoamines such as norepinephrine and dopamine, known to be facilitators of  emotions, through 
the cortex, and hence shape our affective reactions to the world around us (Panksepp 2001, 2012) 
which are crucial to brain function (Damasio 1995, 1999). They form the `value system’ identified 
by Edelman (1989, 1992) and Edelman and Tononi (2001) as guiding the brain plasticity made 
possible by neuronal group selection. This is a crucial mechanism for brain plasticity, allowing 
innate primary emotions to shape adaptation to the physical and social environment in the light of 
our ongoing experience (Ellis and Toronchuk 2005). 
 
There has to be an evolutionary explanation for the existence of these ascending systems in the 
brain, which are quite different than the local connections characterising the neural columns that 
dominate the cortex (Hawkins and Blakeslee 2005). The need for evolution of the innate emotional 
systems – a key influence in evolutionary history – is the obvious answer. And the need for some of 
these systems was driven by the evolutionary advantage of group formation, as discussed above.  
 
However not all of these affective systems are of this group-based character. A proposed set of such 
primary emotional systems is shown in Table 1. This is a summary of the proposals of Toronchuk 
and Ellis (2013), adapted from those of Panksepp (1998, 2013) by inclusion also of a disgust system 
(Toronchuk and Ellis 2007) and the ranking system. This proposal is split into two sets: those 
characterised as fulfilling individual needs (E0-E5), and those fulfilling social needs (E6-E9).  The 
obvious implication is,  
 
Multilevel selection proposal: (E0-E5) are innate affective systems selected through MLS1E 
because of individual advantage given through traits z1E, and (E6-E9) are such systems  
selected through MLS1G because of group advantage given through traits Z1G.   
 
A case where this may be contentious is Play (E5), which has been classified as an individual trait, 
even though it plays a considerable role in inter-individual interactions. The view taken here is that 
the ultimate source of play is indeed in the individual mind, as it explores reality and tries out 
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 A conveniently accessible paper showing the structure of these systems is Scarr et al (2013).  
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different options in a creative way – an essential part of the learning process. Group play is 
derivative from this individual tendency, rather than the other way round.  
 
This proposal accounts for existence both of these behavioural characteristics, and the neural 
systems (Kingsley 1996: 132-133) that lead to their existence. It has an essentially multi-level 
nature. If one does not agree with this specific proposal for innate emotional systems, the same issue 
of the nature of evolutionary origins of the mechanism will arise for any other competing proposal 
for innate emotional systems (e.g. proposals that there is only one valenced affective system). 
 
5 THE BIG PICTURE 
 
This paper has used the specific example of existence of social groups to support the usefulness of 
the distinction between MLS1G and MLS1E (Section 2). Such a distinction is needed to give an 
evolutionary explanation both for the existence of the emotional systems that are crucial to 
intellectual functioning (Damasio 1995, 1999), and also for the ascending systems and associated 
nuclei in the brain that are the neural bases for these emotional systems (Scarr et al 2013). Together 
with the case of meiotic drive quoted by Okasha (2006),  this example serves as an existence proof 
of causal effectiveness of multilevel selection. If correct, this analysis implies that discussion of 
evolutionary processes leading to innate behaviour and brain modules should take into account the 
key role played by emotional systems in the development of  these behaviours and modules (Ellis 
and Toronchuk 2005). Omitting this link, based in specific neuronal mechanisms, can arguably lead 
to incorrect claims about existence of innate brain modules (Ellis 2008).  
 
The analysis above also confirms the idea of top-down causation in the adaptive selection process 
(Campbell 1974, Martinez and Moya 2012). Indeed it supports the view that emergence of 
complexity such as life requires a reverse of flow of information, from bottom-up only to also 
including a flow from the environment down (Walker, Cisneros and Davies 2012), where “the 
environment” includes the group.  This reverse flow is needed because adaptive selection causes 
adaptations of the organism to the environment: but this cannot happen unless information flows 
down from the environment into the organism, where it alters both structure and behaviour.  This is 
what has happened in the past in the case of the coming into being of the innate primary emotional 
systems, which can be claimed to have played a key role in evolutionary development. However, in 
contrast to Campbell’s compelling example of the jaw of a worker or termite ant (Campbell 1974),
4
 
the top-down mechanism considered here is essentially multi-level, see Figure 1. 
 
                                                           
4
 This example is considered in depth in Brown and Murphy (2007): 57-58 and in Martinez and Moya (2011): 
7/16-8/16. 
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The analysis presented here emphasizes the importance of taking biological mechanisms seriously in 
studies of evolutionary selection. The proposal made here suggests further useful developments:  
 
• Seeing how this view extends to the level of cells, where the selection pressures that lead to 
existence of chemical synapses between neurons, rather than much faster electrical synapses, can 
plausibly be related to the evolutionary need to develop synaptic plasticity that can be affected by the 
diffusely projected neuromodulators that form Edelman’s `value system’  (Edelman 1992).   
 
• Seeing how this view extends even further to the underlying level of genes, where the key 
feature of multiple realizability, which underlies all top-down causation (Ellis 2012), leads to 
selection based in equivalence classes of sets of genes, rather than selection of individual genes. 
 
In both these cases (selection at the neuronal level and selection at the genetic level) it is clear that 
the selection mechanisms in operation can only be of the multi-level  kind discussed in this paper, as 
represented in Diagram 1, because there simply is no direct link from the adaptive environment to 
either neurons or genes. The adaptive causal link in both cases is necessarily via the survival 
prospects of individual animals on the one hand, and the social groups to which the individuals 
belong on the other, as discussed above. Multi-level selection, expressed in a suitable extension of 
Diagram 1, has to be the core of what is going on. 
 
Clearly there will be other contexts where the distinctions proposed in this paper might be useful: 
indeed they may be relevant anywhere where multilevel selection might perhaps be in play. 
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EVOLUTIONARY 
 NEEDS MET  
 
PRIMARY EMOTIONAL 
          SYSTEM 
 
        FUNCTIONS 
 
 
INDIVIDUAL NEEDS 
 
 
 
Basic Functioning 
 
E0: PLEASURE System 
         (satiation, satisfaction) 
 
E1  SEEKING System 
 
Situation Evaluation, provides 
arousal/ excitement; incentive 
salience, hedonic appraisal, and 
facilitates learning  
 
E2: DISGUST System 
        (repulsion) 
 
Avoiding harmful foods,   
substances,  environments 
 
E3: RAGE system 
 
Defence: aggression, protection 
of resources, and con-specifics,  
 
 
Basic Survival 
 
E4: FEAR System 
 
Defence: flight, limiting of tissue 
damage 
 
 
Learning 
 
E5: PLAY system 
 
Development of basic adaptive 
and imaginative skills, creativity  
[also builds social bonds] 
 
 
SOCIAL NEEDS 
 
 
 
Reproduction 
 
E6: LUST system 
 
    E6A: Sexual desire 
    E6B: Sexual satisfaction 
 
Ensuring procreation, 
enhancement of bonding  
 
 
E7: PANIC/attachment   
(affiliation, separation distress) 
 
Protection of vulnerable 
individuals; creates bonding 
through need for others 
 
Group cohesion: 
Bonding and 
Development  
 
 
 
 
E8: CARE system 
 
Caring for others, particularly 
offspring 
 
 
Group function: 
  Regulating conflict 
 
 
E9: POWER/dominance 
system 
(rank, status, submission) 
 
Controlling aggression in society, 
allocating resources, esp. sexual 
ones. 
 
 
Table 1: Evolutionary needs, and the emotional systems that have evolved to meet them.  
E0/E1 is a generalised system providing incentive for the others, and initiated by them. Adapted 
from Toronchuk and Ellis (2013), which develops from Pankskepp (1998). 
 
 
